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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
In many countries direct competition on the tracks have been debated but so far not 
implemented in many places. In Great Britain the first ambitions to implement such 
competition was replaced by competition for the tracks, i.e., competitive tendering. The 
turbulence in Great Britain in the railway sector have been extensively debated and described. 
Two examples of critical analyses are found in Nash and Preston (1991) and Nash (2003).  
 
In Sweden a parliamentary Rail committee (Järnvägsutredningen) has proposed free on-track 
competition on specific segments of the railway network, e.g., between the two largest cities 
Stockholm and Gothenburg.  Some regional public transport authorities have also expressed 
their wish to take over some of the routes that belong to the Swedish State Railways (SJ) and 
operate them as regional routes with special discount fares. 
 
The Swedish Institute for Transport and Communications analysis (SIKA) has financed this 
work, aiming to find possible consequences of these two examples for ”on-track 
competition”. The method used is simulations by the network program Vips. The work does 
not cover all possible expressions that competition may take, but provides indications of what 
may happen if the chosen assumptions on competition would come true.   
 
We take into account that passengers are not homogenous. Different groups meet different 
prices and they have different valuations of travel time saving. Each passenger group is given 
its own price structure in terms of a base fare and a non-linear kilometre fare. We are then 
able to assess the effects for each respective passenger group in terms of consumer surplus. 
                                                 
* The Swedish Institute for Transport and Communications Analysis financed this work. 
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Other effects that are taken into account in our cost-benefit analysis are the operators’ 
revenues and costs, external effects and the finances of the public sector. 
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2 ASSUMPTIONS  
2.1 Case study 1 
 
The reference alternative (denoted RA) is the existing situation that all trains between 
Stockholm and Gothenburg, along two different, north and south, corridors, are operated by 
the state monopoly SJ.  
 
The competition alternative (denoted CA) is assumed to mean: 
 
• that both paths are operated by SJ and a private operator, 
• that both operators apply the same price, 
• that both operators take half of the departures each 
• that times of departure (slots) are uniformly distributed between the operators 
 
The table below show the routes and itineraries and intervals today and for the competitive 
situation, where the private operator is denoted PR. The different ride times along the south 
corridor are due to different stop patterns. 
 
Table 2.1.1 Routes and itineraries of trains Stockholm-Gothenburg 
Today
Route Route itinerary Ride time Interval Interval Interval
Stockholm-Gothenburg minutes minutes minutes
57a Stockholm - via north corridor - Gothenburg 4 hours 8 minutes 120 SJ 240 PR 240
60a Stockholm- via sourth corridor - Gothenburg 2 hours 56 minutes 480 SJ 960 PR 960
60b Stockholm- via sourth corridor - Gothenburg 3 hours 8 minutes 96 SJ 192 PR 192
60c Stockholm- via sourth corridor - Gothenburg 3 hours 7 minutes 160 SJ 320 PR 320
Competition
 
 
Note that each operator is assumed to apply constant intervals between departures of their 
own trains but that departure times between the trains of the two operators are uniformly 
distributed. Without any other knowledge this seems the most plausible assumptions since co-
ordination would probably need government intervention and here we assume non-
intervention. 
 
At present SJ is co-ordinating at certain stations transfers between trains and between trains 
and country-controlled regional bus services. With competition it is assumed that SJ 
maintains these co-ordination. There is, however, no co-ordination between trains of the 
private operator and trains of SJ and regional buses. The reason is that it is assumed more 
difficult to achieve co-ordination when operators are competing. 
 
With respect to operating costs a critical assumption is whether trains can be used all time, 
except for necessary layover when changing direction, or whether they stand still waiting for 
the next return departure. Hereby we assume two cases, one that they are waiting (poor usage) 
and one intermediate case, the average of waiting all time and no time (good usage).  
 
The table below shows the assumed values of time for the passenger segmentation chosen, 
expressed in € per hour. It also shows the applied weights for wait time, transfer time and 
walk time in relation to ride time. 
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Table 2.1.2 Applied values of time and weights 
VoT
€/hour Wait Transfer Walk
Interregional private 9 0.5 2 1.6
Interregional business 50 1.2 2 1.6
Regional private 5 0.8 2 1.6
Weights in relation to ride time
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2.2 Case study 2 
 
It is assumed that route 92b Växjö-Copenhagen is taken over from SJ by the regional 
authorities, which means that it would compete with the remaining SJ routes. The table below 
shows the routes that run partly parallel with route 92b Växjö-Copenhagen. 
 
Table 2.2.1 Routes that run partly parallel with route 92b 
Itinerary Train type Route number
Stockholm - Copenhagen Inter City 80a
Stockholm - Malmö Fast train 80b
Stockholm - Malmö Fast train 80c
Stockholm - Copenhagen Night train 80Na
Kalmar - Copenhagen Regional train 92a
Växjö - Copenhagen Regional train 92b  
 
The following four competition alternatives with respect to route 92b are assumed and 
simulated: 
 
CA1: The route is abolished, 
CA2: The frequency is doubled, 
CA3: The prices for regional work trips are reduced by 20 %, 
CA4: The prices for regional business and other trips are reduced by 20 %. 
 
The table below shows the assumed values of time for the passenger segmentation chosen, 
expressed in €. per hour. It also shows the applied weights for wait time, transfer time and 
walk time in relation to ride time. 
 
Table 2.2.2 Applied values of time and weights 
VoT
€/hour Wait Transfer Walk
Interregional private 9 0.5 2 1.6
Interregional business 50 1.2 2 1.6
Regional work 5 0.8 2 1.6
Regional leisure 4 0.8 2 1.6
Regional business 33 1.2 2 1.6
Weights in relation to ride time
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4 RESULTS OF CASE STUDY I 
3.1 Demand 
 
On national level the simulations say that rail travel demand would be reduced by 1.3 per cent 
while demand for air transport would grow by 2.1 per cent. Most of the rail passengers would 
shift to car. The demand for regional buses decreases due to complementarities (buses feed 
trains). 
 
The table below shows the estimated demand changes in terms of boarding passengers for the 
routes between Stockholm and Gothenburg. 
 
Table 3.1.1 Changes of demand due to competition 
Route RA Route CA Route Difference Difference
Boardings Boardings Boardings %
57a 3 206 652 57a-SJ 1 372 446 57a -525 684 -16
57a-PR 1 308 522
60a 104 295 60a-SJ 59 573 60a 14 839 14
60a-PR 59 561
60b 1 010 120 60b-SJ 508 782 60b -8 538 -1
60b-PR 492 800
60c 564 641 60c-SJ 309 568 60c 6 667 1
60c-PR 261 740
Total SJ 4 885 708 2 250 369 -2 635 339
Total PR 0 2 122 623 2 122 623
Total 4 885 708 Total 4 372 992 Total -512 716 -10
RA CA Differences
 
 
 
In the aggregate the routes Stockholm-Gothenburg lose about 10 % of the passengers, most of 
which change to air services. On all routes SJ would get more passengers than the private 
alternative due to the assumed co-ordination of SJ services. 
 
The map below illustrates the changes of flows on rail and air links. 
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Map 3.1.1 Estimated changes of passenger flows on rail- and air links 
Förändring i tåglaster SIKA 
UA-JA
+ - Passenger
0 - 
200000 
Passengers
 
 
 
3.2 Passenger benefits and costs 
 
The table below shows the calculated changes of price of travel and time of travel plus the 
total in terms of consumer surplus. 
 
Table 3.2.1 Estimated changes of consumer surplus 
Private Private Business Sum
regional interregional interregional
5 €/hour 9 €/hor 50 €/hour M€/år
Consumer surplus 0 -4 -13 -16
  of which fare 0 -2 -1 -3
  of which time 0 -1 -12 -14  
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Regional private journeys seem to be unaffected while interregional travellers make losses. 
 
The map below illustrates the regional distribution of losses of consumer surplus per journey. 
 
Map 3.2.1 Geographic distribution of loss of consumer surplus per journey 
Vinnare & förlorare SIKA UA1
+ -
Weighted Time
0,3 minutes
0,03 minutes
 
 
Apparently losses appear in many places along the routes but also in areas quite far from the 
railway line Stockholm and Gothenburg. 
 
3.3 Finances of operators 
 
The tables below show the calculated outcomes in terms of revenues and costs due to the new 
competitive scheme. 
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Table 3.3.1 Changes of revenues and costs with poor usage of trains 
CA-RA CA-RA CA-RA
Difference Difference Difference
Revenues Costs Rev. - cost
Mode M€/year M€/year M€/year
Train -22 32 -55
Flight 17 0 16
Coach 0 0 0
Regional bus 0 0 0
Total -6 33 -39  
 
Table 3.3.2 Changes of revenues and costs with medium usage of trains 
CA-RA CA-RA CA-RA
Difference Difference Difference
Revenues Costs Rev. - cost
Mode M€/year M€/year M€/year
Train -22 15 -38
Flight 17 0 16
Coach 0 0 0
Regional bus 0 0 0
Total -6 16 -22  
 
The airlines would gain revenues at constant cost level since there is no need for increased 
capacity at the calculated level of demand increase. 
 
The railway would lose revenue. It would also experience higher costs due to less efficient 
use of rolling stock when the intervals between departures are increased. Note that the cost 
increase is higher with poor usage of trains. 
 
3.4 Cost-benefit results 
 
The tables below summarises the calculated outcome in terms of components of the cost-
benefit calculus. 
 
Table 3.4.1 Cost-benefit results for the two assumptions on usage of trains 
Low Medium
CA-RA M€/year M€/year
Consumer surplus -16 -16
  of whcih fare -3 -3
  of which time -14 -14
Producer surplus -39 -22
Tax correction 8 4
Public sector 7 7
Excess burden 2 2
External effects -2 -2
Net surplus -40 -27
Usage of trains
 
 
 
3.5 Conclusions of case study I 
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The worsening of exploitation of network effects means a loss of consumer surplus of around 
16 M€ per year. A consequence of the poorer level of service is that rail services lose 10 per 
cent of their passengers and revenues between Stockholm and Gothenburg. 
 
Worsening of exploitation of economies of scale means cost increases between 16 and 33 M€ 
per year, which implies a loss of producer surplus between 22 and 39 M€. 
 
Another consequence of the poorer level of service is increase of car travel at an estimated 
environmental cost of 2M€ per year. 
 
All in all this form of competition ”on the track” is estimated to yield a negative net social 
surplus of the magnitude 27 to 40 M€ per year. 
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4 RESULTS OF CASE STUDY II 
4.1 Demand 
 
4.1.1 CA1: The route is abolished, 
 
Total rail demand on the parallel routes would diminish by 14 per cent in terms of number of 
boardings but with only 5 percent in terms of passenger kilometres. This means that there are 
mainly short journeys that are affected. It is mainly the route 92 a, Kalmar  - Copenhagen that 
takes over the passengers from route 92a. 
 
 
4.1.2 CA2: The frequency is doubled, 
 
With doubling of the frequency total demand increases by 1 per cent in terms of passenger 
kilometres and by 18 per cent in terms of boardings. 
 
 
4.1.3 CA3: The prices for regional work trips are reduced by 20 %, 
 
The price reduction means that mainly the SJ operated competitor 92a would lose passengers. 
Total demand on the routes would increase by 3 per cent. 
 
 
4.1.4 CA4: The prices for regional business and other trips are reduced by 20 %. 
 
The demand changes are similar to those when work trips get lower prices but it is now 
regional business and other journeys that are attracted to route 92b.  
 
For all the cases CA1-CA4 some of the routes competing with route 92b function as 
substitutes. It is however interesting to note that for the supply change cases, CA1 and CA2, 
some routes also function as complements. It is also found that the effects of the assumed 
changes of route 92b spread to many other railway lines than those that run more or less 
parallel. 
 
4.2 Passenger benefits and costs 
 
The table below shows the calculated changes of price of travel time plus the sum in terms of 
consumer surplus expressed in money. 
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Table 4.2.1 Estimated changes of consumer surplus 
Regional Regional Regional Interregional Interregional Sum
work leisure business private business M€/år
Case CA1
Consumer surplus -2,3 0,0 0,0 -0,1 -0,2 -2,6
   of which fare -1,8 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 -1,8
   of which time -0,5 0,0 0,0 -0,1 -0,2 -0,8
Case CA2
Consumer surplus 1,5 0,0 0,2 0,1 0,0 1,9
   of which fare 0,9 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,9
   of which time 0,6 0,0 0,2 0,1 0,0 1,0
Case CA3
Consumer surplus 0,8 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,8
   of which fare 0,9 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,9
   of which time -0,2 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 -0,2
Case CA4
Consumer surplus 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
   of which fare 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
   of which time 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0  
 
4.3 Finances of operators 
 
The table below shows the calculated outcome in terms of revenues and costs due to the new 
competitive scheme. 
 
Table 5.3.1 Changes of revenues and costs  
CA-RA CA-RA CA-RA
Difference Difference Difference
Revenues Costs Rev. - cost
M€/year M€/year M€/year
Case CA1 -0,16 -1,28 1,11
Case CA2 0,17 1,27 -1,10
Case CA3 0,22 1,32 -1,10
Case CA4 0,22 1,32 -1,10  
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4.4 Cost-benefit results 
 
The tables below summarises the calculated outcome in cost-benefit terms. 
 
Table 4.4.1 Cost-benefit results for the two assumptions on usage of trains 
M€/year M€/year M€/year M€/year
CA1 CA2 CA3 CA4
Consumer surplus -2,6 1,9 0,8 0,0
  of whcih fare -1,8 0,9 0,9 0,0
  of which time -0,8 1,0 -0,2 0,0
Producer surplus 10,2 -10,1 -0,5 0,5
Tax correction 2,9 -2,9 0,0 0,0
Public sector 0,6 -1,8 -0,1 -0,3
Excess burden 0,2 -0,5 0,0 -0,1
External effects 0,0 0,5 0,1 0,1
Net surplus 11,4 -12,9 0,2 0,2  
 
4.5 Conclusions of case study II 
 
To abolish route 92b seems to be the most socially beneficial action. The reason is that rail 
services in this case are fairly expensive in relation to passenger benefits and ticket revenues. 
This action is, however, hardly realistic if the regional authority would take over the service. 
 
If the regional authority would take over the service and double its frequency the social loss is 
not negligible. The reason again is the high operation costs. 
 
The best solution if a take-over comes true seems to be to keep the supply unchanged and 
reduce the prices of work journeys. In practice this would mean to sell season tickets 
substantially cheaper per journey than single tickets. 
 
5 OVERALL CONCLUSIONS  
 
The analyses made here demonstrate that competition ”on the track” is not necessarily 
socially beneficial. There are both positive passenger network effects and economies of scale 
effects that partly get lost under this competitive form.  
 
We also learned that the effects of competition may spread over more routes and larger areas 
than might be anticipated. We have also seen that routes may be both supplementary and 
complementary. 
 
A conclusion is that it seems wise to analyse in detail any proposal on competition and carry 
out simulation studies of the kind demonstrated here before decisions on competition are 
taken. 
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